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ABSTRACT 
 
To further our understanding about how to control Internet abuse in the workplace, this study 
examines how a person’s level of self-control leads to cyber-slacking, how deterrence measures 
commonly used within organizations impact individual decisions to cyber-slack, and how self-
control moderates the relative salience of one of the commonly used deterrence mechanisms 
against cyber-slacking, detection (monitoring) systems.  The results suggest that individuals that 
rate low in self-control overlook potential consequences for abusing the Internet in favor of 
immediate rewards, thus they have difficulty self-regulating themselves and have a higher 
propensity to cyber-slack.  The results also indicate that detection systems and awareness of the 
enforcement of sanctions are the biggest deterrents on individual intentions to cyber-slack and 
detection systems are even more salient to individuals that rate low in self-control.   
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INTRODUCTION 
  
he Internet and its associated technologies (hereafter, Internet resources) have, in many respects, 
altered the way work is performed.  They have created a new medium for employees to interact and 
share information around the globe (Whitty & Carr, 2006).  Despite the Internet’s ability to impact 
the communication process and potentially improve the speed and efficiency in which individuals do their jobs, it 
can have harmful affects on organizations (George, 1996; Griffiths, 2003; Lee & Lee 2002; Lee, Lim & Wong, 
2005a).  The Internet has introduced new temptations that can dominate an individual’s workday (Urbaczewski & 
Jessup, 2002).  The U.S. Treasury Department found that cyber-slacking accounts for nearly 51 percent of 
employees time on-line (Davis, 2001), and includes activities like answering personal emails, participating in chat 
rooms, on-line shopping, managing personal finances, or viewing pornography.   
 
 Employees appear to have a view of cyber-slacking that seem to be perpetuating its pervasiveness.  Surveys 
of organizations and employees have found that greater than 60 percent of organizations have reprimanded and 30 
percent have terminated employees for cyber-slacking (Greenfield & Davis, 2002) yet employees still seem to feel 
that Internet resources should be available for both work and non-work related activities (Whitty, 2002; 2004).  This 
evidence seems to suggest that rather than reducing costs and increasing a firm’s competitive advantage, Internet 
resources are often abused and may actually cost employers through lost productivity.  For this reason, it seems 
important that we develop a deeper understanding of how individuals feel about Internet use in the workplace, how 
workplace norms about Internet usage develop, and what mechanisms are available for employers to help reduce the 
negative impact of the Internet.  This paper makes a contribution to the study of business, information systems, and 
ethics by looking at how an individual’s level of self-control relates to his or her propensity to cyber-slack and how 
self-control and past cyber-slacking behavior impact deterrence mechanisms such as security detection systems.    
 
T 
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 One could argue that cyber-slacking is a matter of ethics and existing knowledge about ethical decisions 
may apply.  However, new issues typically do not have well developed social norms that drive individual attitudes 
about them.  This may be the case with the Internet and particularly, Internet abuse.  Researchers have suggested 
that existing knowledge about ethical decisions may not hold true for postmodern issues.  In many cases, modern 
issues lack existing norms thus the impact of individual characteristics and situations unique to the decision maker 
are likely more salient (Dillard and Yuthas, 2002).  Dillard and Yuthas (2002 pg. 186) state that “Postmodernism 
further rejects the deontological concept of reason providing the means by which universally grounded rules, norms, 
or principles can be ascertained.  A decision maker is faced with the ambiguity of ethical choices in the absence of 
any individual moral responsibility.”  The advent of the Internet has created a postmodern ethical dilemma; cyber-
slacking, that may not have well established norms associated with it to drive individual behavior.  
 
 To date, there has been little research on how to reduce cyber-slacking.  The research that has been 
performed seems to show that cyber-slacking is on the rise and efforts to deter it have had limited success.  Even 
when deterrence efforts are successful, they can have other potentially harmful effects (Lee & Lee, 2002; Lee et al., 
2005b; Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002).  For example, Urbaczewski and Jessup (2002) found that monitoring 
activities seem to keep employees from wasting time on non-work related activities but found that this is offset by 
the negative affect that monitoring activities have on workplace satisfaction and trust.  In addition, monitoring 
activities can have a significant monetary cost (Stewart, 2000).   
 
 Acceptable use policies (AUPs) for Internet based applications are a widely used deterrence mechanisms 
focused on cyber-slacking (Retkwa, 1996).  AUPs often consist of guidelines on proper Internet use, usage 
monitoring, and punishment for inappropriate use (Siau, Nah, & Teng, 2002; Stiefer, 2000).  A survey by Greenfield 
and Davis (2002) found that nearly 87 percent of organizations have AUPs.  With such a wide acceptance, we 
question why is cyber-slacking so pervasive?  Various researchers have examined the impact of AUPs and found 
that in general, AUPs seem to impact Internet usage intentions by making employees aware of what activities are 
improper and that there are potential ramifications for cyber-slacking (Harrington, 1996; Lee & Lee, 2002; Lee et al. 
2005b).  In addition, researchers have found that monitoring systems (Harrington, 1996; Lee & Lee, 2002) and the 
awareness of others being punished for cyber-slacking (Lee & Lee, 2002; Woon & Pee, 2004; Ugrin and Pearson, 
2007) have a deterrent effect.   
 
 One possible explanation for the pervasiveness of cyber-slacking is that particular deterrence components 
do not provide enough motivation to slow this activity down.  For example, Greenfield and Davis (2002) found that 
despite the wide use of AUPs, only about half of the organizations they surveyed actively enforce their policies.  
Thus, one can question how important is enforcement?  The same question could be asked about monitoring 
mechanisms or other deterrence measures.   
 
 Another possible explanation for the pervasiveness of cyber-slacking is that deterrence factors don't impact 
all employees the same.  As mentioned, postmodern dilemmas may not have well developed norms and individual 
factors typically drive behaviors related to those dilemmas, thus it is important to understand how deterrence 
mechanisms work on different types of individuals.  This paper examines the relative impact of deterrence 
mechanisms on worker's decisions to cyber-slack and how the impact of deterrence mechanisms is altered by the 
individual’s level of self-control and past history (habit) of cyber-slacking.  By using a multi-criteria decision 
methodology (policy capturing), we are able to examine how individuals incorporate different control mechanisms 
(decision cues) into their decision to cyber-slack and how self-control and habit influence how they apply the cues. 
 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  First, we discus cyber-slacking and the factors that 
influence it.  Then, we present a theoretical background on how deterrence mechanisms reduce illicit behaviors such 
as cyber-slacking.  We then examine the impact of self-control and past cyber-slacking behavior on the relative 
salience of the deterrence factors.  Finally, we present our research design, an analysis of results, and conclude by 
discussing the potential contributions of this research. 
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CYBER-SLACKING – ANTECEDENTS AND INFLUENCING FACTORS 
 
 Cyber-slacking in the workplace has been tagged with various labels including cyber-slouching 
(Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002), cyber-loafing (Lim, 2002), junk computing (Guthrie & Gray, 1996), and non-work 
related computing (Lee et al. 2005).  The common thread between these terms is that they all describe unproductive 
use of the Internet in the workplace.  Examples of cyber-slacking are chatting, instant messaging, sending and 
receiving personal e-mail, online shopping, investment trading, gaming, reading or watching online media, and 
viewing pornography, among other things.    
 
 Research examining the inherent factors that antecede cyber-slacking has yielded a surprising profile of the 
typical Internet abuser.  Stanton (2002) found that men and women are equally likely to abuse the Internet and that 
Internet abusers are more likely to be highly satisfied employees.  In addition, Ugrin, Pearson and Odom (2007) 
found that executives are more likely to cyber-slack compared to other types of workers.  The results of these papers 
are a far cry from the solitary, discontented, young male that is the typical stereotype of an Internet abuser.  In 
addition, Amiel and Sargent (2004) found that personality types describe the ways in which different types of 
individuals abuse the Internet.  They found that neurotic individuals used the Internet more for information gathering 
and developing relationships, individuals high in extraversion used the Internet more for tasks related to personal 
goals, and individuals high in psychoticism used the Internet for more deviant or destructive types of activities.  In 
addition to inherent factors, other factors that have been shown to antecede cyber-slacking include perceived 
accessibility (Lee et al. 2005b) and affect (Woon and Pee, 2004).  Finally, cyber-slacking appears to be a self 
perpetuating cycle where undetected abuse leads to more slacking in the future.  Prior research has found that 
individuals that have cyber-slacked in the past are more likely to perform it in the future (Lee et al. 2005b; Woon & 
Pee, 2004). 
 
 One factor that has not been looked at in relation to cyber-slacking but has been shown to have a 
relationship with other types of illicit behavior is self-control.  Nagin and Paternoster (1993) introduced self-control 
as a stable trait that influences one's propensity to commit illicit activities.  Nagin and Paternoster’s results indicate 
that individuals that are low in self-control “perceive a higher utility for illicit behavior since the rewards are 
immediate, and would discount the costs since they are delayed” and “have less developed consciences, making self-
censure less effective.” They found that self-control has a direct positive impact on individual’s intention to partake 
in several types of illicit behavior, which we expect will be the same when it comes to cyber-slacking.  We posit that 
individuals that are low in self-control will have a greater history of cyber-slacking.   
 
H1:  Individuals that rate lower in self-control will have a greater history of cyber-slacking.   
  
 Research on deterring cyber-slacking has shown that this behavior can be negatively affected by merely 
having an AUP (Harrington, 1996; Lee & Lee, 2002; Lee et al. 2005b), installing monitoring mechanisms 
(Harrington, 1996; Lee & Lee, 2002; Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002; Whitty, 2004) and enforcement through 
punishment (Lee & Lee, 2002).  Harrington (1996) found that codes of ethics that were specifically related to 
Internet usage reduced cyber-slacking intentions.  Urbaczewski and Jessup (2002) and Whitty (2004) found that 
monitoring mechanisms that either track or deny access to sites along with monitoring emails reduced cyber-
slacking.  Lee and Lee (2002) found that individuals that were aware of others receiving punishment for cyber-
slacking had a lower propensity to cyber-slack.   The next section details the theory behind how deterrence 
mechanisms like these can reduce cyber-slacking. 
 
DETERRING CYBER-SLACKING: A THEORTICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 There are two major theoretical perspectives related to deterring illicit behavior such as cyber-slacking, a 
self-regulated model and an imposed model (Tyler & Blader, 2003; 2005).  In short, the self regulated model focuses 
on an individual's inherent desires to follow the rules.  When an individual's values align with the policies set forth 
by an authority, the individual is more likely to comply (Aalders & Wilthagan, 1997; Gunningham & Rees, 1997; 
King & Lenox, 2000; Rechtschafen, 1998; Suchman, 1995; Tyler, 2001; Tyler and Darley; 2001; Tyler & Blader, 
2003; 2005).  The effectiveness of the self-regulated model has received positive evidence in a variety of contexts 
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(Tyler & Blader, 2003; 2005).  However, due to the continued growth of cyber-slacking, it seems that the self-
regulated model may not be adequate for this postmodern dilemma.  As mentioned, strong social norms related to 
cyber-slacking may not be well developed and the norms that are developing seem indicate that cyber-slacking is 
accepted behavior (Whitty, 2002; 2004; Ugrin & Pearson, 2007).  In either case, the evidence seems to suggest that 
deterrence mechanisms need to be imposed by organizations that wish to curb cyber-slacking. 
 
 General Deterrence Theory (GDT) provides a theoretical foundation for an imposed model that emphasizes 
the use of sanctions to deter illicit behavior.  GDT is a utility based model that suggests that individuals are rational 
actors that weigh perceived costs against perceived benefits (Williams & Hawkins, 1986).   When employees are 
presented with opportunities, they select the opportunity that maximizes the total utility of perceived returns versus 
perceived costs (Tyler & Blader, 2003; 2005; Blair & Stout, 2001).  GDT states that deterrence mechanisms that 
increase the likelihood
1
, severity, and celerity of punishment can reduce illicit behavior (Williams & Hawkins, 1986; 
Beccaria, 1963) (Figure 1).  GDT is the theoretical foundation for large body of criminological research that has 
examined the impact of legal sanctions on illicit behavior and has recently been extended to the impact of sanctions 
on cyber-slacking (Lee et al., 2005b; Woon & Pee, 2004; Lee & Lee, 2002).   
 
APPLICATION OF GENERAL DETERRENCE THEORY ON CYBER-SLACKING 
 
 As mentioned, acceptable use policies (AUPs) are commonly used mechanisms designed to guide 
employee usage and misusage of Internet resources in the workplace.  Stewart (2000) suggested that AUPs should 
include measures that are strict enough to reduce cyber-slacking but should be tolerant enough to allow employee 
the potential productivity gains that the Internet can offer.  Typical components of an AUP include; (1) an 
explanation of the scope of the AUP (e.g. who and what does it apply to); (2) a statement defining appropriate use; 
(3)  examples of appropriate versus inappropriate use; (4) a statement defining punishment for inappropriate use; (5) 
a statement about the extent of monitoring; and (6) a signature of the employee acknowledging that they have 
received and understand the policy (Siau et al., 2002; Stiefer, 2000).   
 
 The extant literature on AUPs is limited, yet other research related to codes of ethics is highly related.  In 
short, researchers have suggested that generic corporate codes of ethics have little impact on employee behaviors yet 
codes of ethics that are more specific towards a targeted behavior do (Cressy & Moore, 1983; Fimble & Burnstein, 
1990; Harrington, 1996).  For example, Harrington (1996) found that generic codes of ethics had no impact on 
deterring computer abuse while IT specific codes of ethics did.  Harrington (1996, p. 258) suggests that IT specific 
codes of ethics “clarify responsibility and so deter unethical behavior.”   
 
 Case and Young (2002b) examined the impact of signing an AUP.  They found that signing an AUP 
reduces cyber-slacking.  In short, they found that 68 percent of survey respondents that worked for organizations 
that had an AUP were required to sign a statement indicating they were in agreement with the policy and that 53 
percent of those individuals indicated that an AUP was an effective deterrent versus only 13 percent of those that 
were not required to sign a statement related to the AUP.   
 
 As mentioned above, an AUP typically outlines the potential sanctions for cyber-slacking.  GDT suggests 
that more severe sanctions will have an increasing degree of deterrence.  Thus, when a statement is included in an 
AUP that outlines severe sanctions that may be handed down for cyber-slacking, individual intentions to cyber-slack 
are reduced (Lee & Lee, 2002; Williams & Hawkins, 1986; Woon & Pee, 2004).  In addition to the mere threat of 
punishment within a policy, researchers have examined the impact the awareness of enforcement on illicit behavior.  
Lee and Lee (2002) and Woon and Pee (2004) found that when individuals were aware of others getting punished 
for cyber-slacking, they had lower intentions to perform similar behavior.   
 
 The last deterrence mechanism that is typically used is detection systems that monitor Internet activity.  
When confronted with choices to commit dishonest behavior, individuals take into account perceived benefits and 
                                                 
1 The general consensus among researchers is that the likelihood of punishment is best operationalized by examining perceived 
risk of being detected (Hollinger & Clark, 1983) 
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consequences.  However, there must be a strong chance of being caught for consequences to be salient and a set of 
rules; or in this case an AUP, to be effective (Williams & Hawkins, 1986).  Thus, when consequences are perceived 
to have a greater likelihood, they will have greater deterrence.  In general, the consensus about measuring the 
likelihood of detection is that it is best measured by “exploring the employee’s perceived risk of being discovered … 
not necessarily by investigating the combined threat of apprehension and punishment (Hollinger & Clark, 1983, pg. 
402).  Urbaczewski and Jessup (2002) studied the impact of monitoring activities and found that they have a 
significant impact on deterring cyber-slacking.   
 
 Although all of these mechanisms impact cyber-slacking, they do not come without costs.  For example, 
monitoring systems have both monetary costs (Stewart, 2000) and costs of reduced employee morale and job 
satisfaction (Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002).  In addition, not all factors are always implemented.  Since deterrence 
mechanisms come with other consequences, is seems important to not only examine the importance of deterrence 
mechanisms alone (as shown by the literature cited above) but also how different deterrence mechanisms work 
relative to one another.   Organizations need to understand the relative impact of deterrence mechanisms when 
making cost benefit decisions on what deterrents they wish to pursue.  Based on GDT, it can be conjectured that 
mechanisms that increase perceptions about the severity and likelihood of punishment will be the most effective.  
Thus the next step in this study is to develop a hierarchy of the relative impact of the commonly used deterrence 
mechanisms tested.    
 
THE AFFECT OF SELF-CONTROL AND BEHAVIORAL HISTORY 
 
 Individual’s self control and prior behavior are not only expected to influence propensity to cyber-slack in 
the future, they are also expected to change the relative impact of deterrence mechanisms, in particular, the impact 
of detection systems.   
 
Self-Control 
 
 Earlier, we mentioned that Nagin and Paternoster (1993, pg. 472) introduced self-control as a stable trait 
that influences one's propensity to commit illicit acts.  Their results indicate that individuals that are low in self-
control “perceive a higher utility for crime since the rewards are immediate, and would discount the costs since they 
are delayed.”  We suggest that self-control will also impact the effectiveness of deterrence mechanisms.  We expect 
that deterrence mechanisms that increase the likelihood of detection will have a larger impact compared to other 
deterrence mechanisms when the respondent has a lower degree of self-control.  The rational behind this is that 
individuals that rate lower in self-control don’t view punishment as being imminent; rather they view it as being in 
the distant future.  We suggest that when detection systems are introduced, individuals that rate low in self-control 
will recognize the potential for punishment that they have previously overlooked.  Thus, detection mechanisms will 
have a greater impact on cyber-slacking relative to other deterrence mechanisms for people that are low in self-
control.  Beyond this, we have no reason hypothesis any relationships between self-control and other deterrence 
components a priori. 
 
H2:  The relative impact of detection systems on individuals that rate lower on self-control will be significantly 
higher than on individuals that rate higher on self-control 
 
Prior Cyber-Slacking Behavior 
 
 As individuals commit abusive behaviors without negative consequences, they begin to form habits that 
build upon themselves.  Habitual abusive behavior leads to further wrongdoing through heightened personal affect 
(emotion) towards the act which positively influences future activities.  Nagin and Paternoster’s (1993) results 
indicated that prior behavior was a strong antecedent to committing theft, drinking and driving, and committing 
sexual assault.  We suggest that habit will also impact the effectiveness of deterrence mechanisms on cyber-
slacking.  We expect that deterrence mechanisms that increase the likelihood of detection will have a stronger 
impact compared to other deterrence mechanisms when the respondent has a more active history of cyber-slacking.  
The rational behind this is that individuals that have previously cyber-slacked without being punished will have 
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developed a habit for cyber-slacking and, like those that are low in self-control, they will have been conditioned to 
overlook the likeliness that they will get caught.  When a detection system is introduced, it will have an impact on 
these individuals by bringing the likelihood of punishment to the forefront.  Thus, it is posited that that prior 
behavior will impact the relative salience of detection systems.   
 
H3:  The relative impact of detection systems on individuals that have cyber-slacked more often in the past will be 
significantly higher than on individuals that have cyber-slacked less often in the past. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 The relationship between self-control and cyber-slacking and the impact of self-control and prior behavior 
on the relative salience of detection mechanisms were tested using regression and the relative salience of deterrence 
mechanisms on reducing cyber-slacking was tested using a policy capturing methodology.  Due to the limited use of 
policy capturing in the information systems discipline, it is discussed in more detail. 
 
Policy Capturing 
 
 Policy capturing is a robust method for understanding multi-criteria decisions.  In short, policy capturing 
explains which available items of information are most salient to an individual decision maker.  It creates an additive 
linear model that allows researchers to capture individual decision making policies.  It also compares and contrast 
differences among decision makers and identifies clusters of individuals with similar decision making policies 
(Karren and Barringer, 2002).  The accuracy and acceptance of policy capturing has been evidenced in previous 
studies in a variety of disciplines.  For example, Karren and Barringer (2002) examined 37 policy capturing studies 
in fields such as organizational behavior, management and psychology, thus illustrating its acceptance as a research 
tool.  Policy capturing has also been used to examine business ethics (e.g. Butler & Cantrell, 1984, Pearson, Crosby, 
& Shim, 1996) and has been an important method in other business literatures (e.g. Ashton, 1974; Marletta and 
Kida, 1993) amongst other disciplines.   
 
 Karren and Barringer (2002) discuss several advantages to using policy capturing versus other methods 
(e.g. having individuals rank variables).  One key problem with having individuals merely rank variables is the 
social desirability effect.  Policy capturing mitigates the social desirability effect by “indirectly assessing the 
importance of explanatory variables" (pg. 338).  In short, policy capturing regresses a dependent variable on 
multiple decision cues resulting in a regression equation for each individual and the beta weights of each individual 
are aggregated resulting in a hierarchy of the decision cues as indicated by their overall average beta weights.  Kline 
and Sulsky (1995, p. 394) state that “the goal of this approach is to understand an individual's decision making 
"policy" by observing the relationships between the decision cues given to the individual, and the final decision 
made by the individual and then modeling that relationship using an idiographic multiple regression analysis (i.e., 
regression analysis carried out for a single individual). The results of the analysis provide a description of how the 
individual decision-maker weights the various cues to arrive at his or her decision. Thus, within the constraints of 
the cue information presented, each individual's decision-making "policy" can be observed.”  The model can be 
stated as: 
            n 
Yj = ∑biXij where j=1,2,....., n 
        
  i =1 
 The cues (or independent variables), Xij, in this study are (1) existence of an acceptable use policy, (2) the 
degree of punishment for cyber-slacking, (3)  awareness of others receiving punishment for cyber-slacking (4) 
evidence of detection systems, and (5) a signature by the participant (employee) on the acceptable use policy 
indicating that they have received it.  The final decision (or dependent variable), Yj, is the individual’s behavioral 
intention to cyber-slack.     
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Procedure 
 
 Participants were given 20 unique scenarios covering all combinations of the independent variables (in 
scenarios where no AUP existed, only the existence of detection systems and awareness of others being punished for 
cyber-slacking were tested), with differing levels of awareness of the existence of a policy, a statement in the policy 
stating that employees will be punished for cyber-slacking, awareness of others being punished for cyber-slacking, 
existence of security and detection systems and the requirement of signing the AUP.  The existence of each 
independent variable, or cue, was indicated by a yes or no statement.  Considering each scenario, respondents were 
asked about whether or not they would use their company’s resources for personal use (Appendix 1).  Prior history 
of cyber-slacking and self-control were measured using 7 and 24 item scales respectively.  The scales are discussed 
in more detail in a subsequent section.   
 
Subjects 
 
 The sample consisted of 161 total participants made up of 85 individuals from 11 companies that 
represented diverse industries and organizational sizes along with 76 undergraduate and graduate students at a large 
mid-western university.  Of the employees at the 11 companies, 82 worked full time and 3 worked part time.  Five 
students worked full time and the rest worked part time or were unemployed.  Thus we had a diverse sample that 
represented both full time and part time employees and both young and old.   
 
 Following the method outlined in Klein and Sulsky (1995) and Karren and Barringer (2002), an initial test 
of internal consistency and reliability was conducted on the individual responses by examining the adjusted R square 
of each individual’s responses about how likely they were to cyber-slack.  The adjusted R square ranged from 0.121 
to 0.987 with an average of 0.590.  Responses with an adjusted R square below .50 indicate inconsistent application 
of the cues and were thus eliminated from further analysis.  Based on this, 49 responses were eliminated from the 
analysis, 18 from students and 31 from employees.  Eighteen additional responses were eliminated because the 
respondents were not employed.  The average R square for the remaining respondents was 0.694.  Table 1 provides 
demographics for the initial 161 respondents and those that were retained for further analysis.  The respective 
makeup of the sample on each factor does not appear to change after elimination of the unusable responses 
indicating that there is no systematic reason for individuals to not respond diligently to the survey.   
 
 
Table 1.  Demographics of Respondents 
 
Gender (n) = 161 (n) = 94 
 (n) Total (n) Usable 
Male 89 49 
Female 72 45 
Age 
18 – 24 63 31 
25 – 29 23 14 
30 – 34 12 9 
35 – 39 20 12 
40 – 44 11 9 
45 – 49 10 5 
50 or older 22 14 
Employment Status 
Full Time 85 45 
Part Time 49 49 
Unemployed 27 0 
Pay Status 
Hourly 52 37 
Salary 83 54 
N/A 26 3 
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Measures 
 
 Self-control is measured via a 24 question likert type scale (Appendix 2) previously validated by Nagin and 
Paternoster (1993) and Grasmick et al. (1993).  Past cyber-slacking behavior was measured using an 8 item likert 
type scale with seven questions asking about past history of performing various types of cyber-slacking from 
chatting and emailing to viewing pornography (Appendix 3).  The questions were developed to capture individual's 
prior behavior on the most common types of cyber-slacking based on the extant literature (e.g. Siau et al., 2002).  
The scale also included one general question related to the individual's overall degree of cyber-slacking.  We 
computed the Chronbach Alpha for the eight questions resulting in an alpha value of .8028 indicating the scale had 
adequate reliability.    
 
Hypothesis Tests  
 
 To test the impact of self-control on prior history, we performed a regression analysis with self-control as 
the independent variable and past cyber-slacking history as the dependent variable.  We found that overall there was 
a positive relationship. (R
2
 = .317; p < .000).  In addition, we found that the relationship holds true for students (R
2
 = 
.358; p < .000) and for workers (R
2
 = .180; p = .001).  Hypothesis one is supported.   
 
 
Table 2.  Relative Importance of Deterrence Measures 
 
Decision Cues (Deterrence Mechanisms) Beta Mean 
HSD (F = 
25.054)* 
You are aware of others within the organization being fired for performing non-work 
related activities on their computer. 
-0.37 A 
The company employs security detection systems capable of monitoring your computer 
usage. 
-0.35 A 
The company's Internet use policy contains a statement stating that you may be fired if 
you perform non-work related activities on your computer. 
-0.26 B 
The company employs an Internet use policy that states what types of Internet use is 
acceptable. 
-0.22 B 
You are required to sign the Internet use policy indicating that you have read, understand, 
and will abide by the policy. 
-0.12 C 
* p < .000 (Items labeled A are significantly different than B and C, B are significantly different than A and C, and C is 
significantly different than A and B) 
 
 
 To develop the hierarchy of the relative impact of the deterrence mechanisms on individual decisions to 
cyber-slack, we performed a linear regression for each respondent that supplied a reliable response and averaged the 
beta weights from the resulting regression equations resulting in an overall hierarchy of the impact of the deterrence 
mechanisms.   The independent variables in each regression were the conditions associated with the five deterrence 
mechanisms (or cues).  The average standardized regression weight, or beta (bi), for each cue indicates its relative 
importance.  Table 2 reports the beta weights of the five deterrence mechanisms on the dependent variable (intention 
to cyber-slack).  Awareness of others getting fired for cyber-slacking had the highest beta weight (-.37), detection 
systems had the second highest beta weight (-.35), a statement indicating that an individual may be fired for cyber-
slacking had the next highest beta weight (-.26), merely having a policy that states what is acceptable had the next 
beta highest weight (-.22), and finally, signing the policy had the lowest weighting (-.12).  
  
To determine if significant differences existed between the betas, an F-test was conducted.  The F-test 
showed significance (F = 25.05; p < .000), thus differences existed between the betas.  Tukey's Honestly Significant 
Difference (HSD) was calculated to determine which criteria were significantly different from one another.  The 
betas resulted in three groupings (A, B, or C) (Table 2).  The betas within the groups were not significantly different 
from one another but were significantly different from the betas in the other groups.  Group A consists of monitoring 
activities and awareness of others being fired for cyber-slacking.  Group B consisted of merely having a policy that 
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states what are acceptable use and a statement that you may be fired for cyber-slacking.  Group C was made up of 
signing the policy.   
 
 To test hypotheses two and three, how self-control and prior cyber-slacking behavior moderate the relative 
impact of detection systems on an individual's propensity to cyber-slack, we regressed self-control (SC) and prior 
cyber-slacking behavior (PRIOR) on the beta weights for detection mechanisms (DETECT) controlling for the 
employees pay status (e.g. if the individual is paid a salary or by the hour) (PAYSTAT), if the individual was full 
time or part time (FTPT), and if the individual is aware of an AUP at his or her current place of employment (AUP).  
In short, we control for employment status (full time or part time) and pay status (hourly and salary) because we 
suspect that they will impact a person’s commitment to the organization (Lee and Johnson, 1991; Tsui, Pearce, 
Porter and Tripoli, 1997) thus impacting their degree of cyber-slacking and likelihood of responding to deterrence 
efforts.  We also suspect that those who are already aware of AUPs at their organizations may be biased by it.  Our 
regression model can be expressed as: 
 
DETECTi = b0 + b1SCi + b2PRIORi + b3PAYSTATi + b4FTPTi + b5AUPi + Ei 
 
 The results related to the hypotheses two and three show that self-control had a significant effect on the 
relative impact (beta weight) of security detection systems (p = .002), supporting hypothesis two.  However, prior 
behavior had no impact on the salience of security detection systems (p = .932), failing to support hypothesis three.  
Table 3 shows the regression output.   
 
 
Table 3.  Output for Self-Control and Prior Behavior on Detection Betas 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .485(a) .236 .192 .23131 
a  Predictors: (Constant), aup, sc, paystat, empstat, prior 
 
 
Model  
Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1.451 5 .290 5.423 .000(a) 
 Residual 4.708 88 .054   
 Total 6.159 93    
a  Predictors: (Constant), aup, sc, paystat, empstat, prior 
b  Dependent Variable: detect 
 
 
Model  Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta   
1 (Constant) -.102 .167  -.613 .542 
 Sc -.008 .003 -.372 -3.181 .002 
 Prior .000 .006 .010 .086 .932 
 Empstat .115 .055 .221 2.097 .039 
 Paystat -.026 .050 -.050 -.522 .603 
 Aup .016 .050 .031 .314 .754 
a  Dependent Variable: detect 
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DISCUSSION  
 
 This study has shown that self-control has a negative relationship with cyber-slacking and that security 
detection mechanisms and awareness of enforcement have the largest deterrence on intentions to cyber-slack.  The 
study also shows that greater self-control results in a lower relative impact of security detection mechanisms.   
 
 As previously discussed, Individuals that are low in self-control have a lower degree of conscience and 
have a higher utility for illicit behavior because they place a greater value on the immediate benefits and a lower 
value on delayed costs as compared to in individual that rates high in self-control.  This holds true in the context of 
cyber-slacking where individuals that rate low in self-control have been shown to have a greater propensity for 
cyber-slacking.  The importance of this for theory is that the impact of the self-control trait holds true with a 
postmodern dilemma, cyber-slacking.  It also supports the notion that postmodern issues are driven by individual 
factors.  The importance for practitioners is that some individuals are more susceptible to cyber-slacking and self-
regulation may not be an option for them.  However, detection mechanisms are available and with our respondents, 
enforced sanctions and detection systems had the greatest degree of deterrence (supporting general deterrence 
theory).  Yet unanswered questions remain, such as do the impacts of enforcement efforts and detection systems 
outweigh their costs monetarily and on employee morale and trust (Urbaczewski and Jessup, 2002; Whitty, 2004).   
  
Finally, the impact of detection efforts is affected by individual levels of self-control.  Individuals that rate 
lower on self-control tend to be impacted more by security detection systems.  In general, this means that detection 
mechanisms have a greater impact on high risk individuals.   
 
 In conclusion, detection mechanisms are a strong deterrent against cyber-slacking and they are even more 
effective on individuals low in self-control who have a higher propensity to cyber-slack.  This may add support for 
the use of detection and monitoring systems; especially in organizations that are already suffering from a great deal 
of cyber-slacking, despite their potential drawbacks.  
 
 This study has some limitations that may be overcome in future research.  First, the measure of prior 
internet activity was based on self-reports reports.  Participants may have been not revealed their actual Internet 
activities, particularly activities related to embarrassing or socially unacceptable behaviors like viewing 
pornography. Next, the study only examined deterrence mechanisms included in AUPs.  Other mechanisms should 
be explored in the future.  Finally, the study treated all types of cyber-slacking equally.  For example, answering 
personal emails was treated the same as viewing pornography.  Participant responses may not have been the same 
over different types of activities.  For instance, detection systems may have a strong impact on behavior that may be 
embarrassing to the participant (such as viewing pornography) and a weak impact on more acceptable types of 
behavior (such as answering personal emails).   
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Appendix 1.  Scenario Example 
 
Imagine that you work for a hypothetical company and the following scenario exists in regards to computer 
deterrence and security measures.  Considering the scenario, answer the following question about your personal use 
of the Internet at work. 
 
Scenario 1 of 20 (Yes means the measure exists.  No means the measure does not exist) 
 
-- The company employs an Internet use policy that states what types    Yes 
       of Internet use is acceptable.    
 
-- The companies Internet use policy contains a statement stating that you  will   No 
        be fired  if you perform non-work related  activities on your computer.    
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-- You are required to sign the Internet Use Policy indicating that you     Yes 
       have read, understand, and will abide by the policy.   
 
-- You are aware of others within the organization being fired for performing   Yes 
       non-work related activities on their computer. 
 
-- The company employs security detection systems capable of monitoring  Yes 
       your computer usage.  
 
1) Based on the scenario, I would use my company's computing resources for personal purposes.  
   
  Strongly        Strongly 
  Disagree   Neutral     Agree 
      1           2       3  4       5  
 
Appendix 2.  Self Control Scale (Nagin and Paternoster, 1993) 
 
1. I devote time an and effort to preparing for the future.  
2. I act on the spur of the moment without stopping to think.  
3. I do thinks that bring me pleasure here and now, even at the cost of some distant goal. 
4. I base my decisions on what will happen to me in the short run rather than in the long run. 
5. I try to avoid projects that I know will be difficult. 
6. When things get complicated, I quit or withdraw. 
7. I do the things in life which are easiest and bring me the most pleasure.  
8. I avoid difficult tasks that stretch my abilities to the limit.  
9. I test myself by doing things that are a little risky. 
10. I take risks just for the fun of it. 
11. I find it exciting to do things for which I might get in trouble.  
12. Excitement and adventure are more important to me than security. 
13. If I have a choice, I will do something physical rather than something mental. 
14. I feel better when I am on the move than when I am sitting and thinking.  
15. I'd rather get out and do things than read or contemplate ideas.  
16. Compared to other people my age, I have a greater need for physical activity.  
17. I look out for myself first, even if it means making things difficult for other people. 
18. I'm not very sympathetic to other people when they are having problems.  
19. I don't care if the things I do upset people.  
20. I will try to get things I want even when I know it's causing problems for other people.  
21. I lose my temper easily.  
22. When I'm angry at people I feel more like hurting them than talking to them about why I am angry.  
23. When I'm really angry, other people better stay away from me.  
24. When I have a serious disagreement with someone, it's usually hard for me to talk calmly about it without 
getting upset. 
 
Appendix 3.  Prior NWRC Behavior  
 
1. I have used computers or computer resources for personal use during work time.  
2. I have participated in online gaming during company time or using company resources.  
3. I have shopped online during work hours or using company computers.  
4. I have performed investment trading during work time or using work computers.  
5. I have chatted with friends or used instant messaging during work time or using company computers.  
6. I have sent or read personal e-mail during work time or using company computers.  
7. I have viewed pornography during work time or using company computers. 
8. I have read or watched personal online media during work time or using work computers. 
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NOTES 
